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ENFORCING FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS IN 
AUSTRALIA AGAINST NON-SIGNATORIES OF THE 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
by Sirko Harder*
This article investigates two questions that may arise in Australian proceedings 
for the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award where the award-debtor is 
not named in the relevant arbitration agreement and asserts that it is not a 
party to that agreement. The fi rst question that may be contested in those 
circumstances is whether the award-debtor is for some reason precluded from 
denying its privity to the relevant arbitration agreement. Where this is not 
the case, the allocation of the onus of proof with regard to the award-debtor’s 
privity to the agreement may become relevant. In the context of investigating 
these two questions, this article discusses the views expressed in IMC Aviation 
Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC, decided in 2011 by Croft  J as trial judge1 
and then by the Victorian Court of Appeal.2
A. Introduction
Arbitral awards are sometimes made against persons not named in the 
underlying arbitration agreement. This occurs because, depending upon the 
applicable law, persons may be bound by an arbitration agreement without 
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1 [2011] VSC 1, (2011) 276 ALR 733. The name of the case was then Altain Khuder 
LLC v IMC Mining Inc. This article indiscriminately uses the name that the case 
had at the appellate level.
2 [2011] VSCA 248, (2011) 282 ALR 717.
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3 Beth Cubitt , ‘Parties to the Arbitration Agreement: Third Parties, Joinder and 
Consolidation’ (2010) 29 The Arbitrator and Mediator 59 at pp 63–67; Simon 
Greenberg, Christopher Kee and J Romesh Weeramantry, International Commercial 
Arbitration: An Asia Pacifi c Perspective (2011), Cambridge University Press, 
paras 4.68–4.82; Bernard Hanotiau, Complex Arbitrations: Multiparty, Multicontract, 
Multi-issue and Class Actions (2005), Kluwer Law International, ch 2.
4 International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), s 8(5)(c). The ground was argued, but not 
proved, in LKT Industrial Bhd (Malaysia) v Chun [2004] NSWSC 820 (‘LKT v Chun’).
being named in the contractual document.3 Where an award is made against a 
non-signatory of the arbitration agreement, the parties to the arbitration may 
join issue on the award-debtor’s privity to the agreement, and the award-
debtor may refuse to comply with the award, requiring the award-creditor to 
seek judicial enforcement of the award, which may occur in a country other 
than the seat of the arbitration. Australian courts may thus face requests for 
the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award made against a non-signatory of 
the agreement in pursuance of which the award was made.
Where the award-debtor received no notice of the arbitral proceedings or 
was otherwise unable to present its case in those proceedings, an enforcement 
of the award in Australia will be refused on that ground alone,4 and the award-
debtor’s privity to the relevant arbitration agreement has no signifi cance. It 
does have signifi cance where the award-debtor had an opportunity to present 
its case in the arbitral proceedings, whether or not that opportunity was 
used. In this situation, the question arises whether it is always open to the 
award-debtor to contest its privity to the relevant arbitration agreement in 
the Australian enforcement proceedings, or whether there are circumstances 
in which a contention of non-privity is precluded, obliging the Australian 
court to assume, without investigation, that the award-debtor is a party to the 
relevant arbitration agreement. Where the award-debtor is free to and does 
contest its privity to the relevant arbitration agreement, the allocation of the 
onus of proof with regard to that issue becomes signifi cant. Is it for the award-
creditor to prove that the award-debtor is a party to the relevant arbitration 
agreement, or is it for the award-debtor to prove the contrary?
These questions relate to the very nature of arbitration as a voluntary 
dispute resolution mechanism, and to the interaction and allocation of 
jurisdiction between the arbitral tribunal, the court at the seat of the arbitration 
(the supervisory court) and the court in the country (other than the seat of 
the arbitration) in which an enforcement of the arbitral award is sought (the 
enforcing court).
This article investigates the questions mentioned. In that context, this 
article discusses the views expressed in IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v 
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Altain Khuder LLC,5 a case highly signifi cant for two reasons. First, it was 
the fi rst case concerning the enforceability in Australia of a foreign arbitral 
award made against a non-signatory of the relevant arbitration agreement. 
Second, on two fundamental issues, namely the onus of proof with regard 
to the award-debtor’s privity to the arbitration agreement and the alleged 
preclusionary eﬀ ect of the arbitral tribunal’s ruling on the issue of privity, the 
views diﬀ ered between Croft  J and the Court of Appeal and within the Court 
of Appeal, generating three diﬀ erent views between the four judges that have 
been involved at the two instances.
This article discusses only those aspects of IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd 
v Altain Khuder LLC that are relevant to the subject matt er of this article. The 
case involved other issues too, in particular the admissibility and probative 
force of certain evidence. Those issues are not addressed here.
Even though the question of preclusion is logically prior to the allocation 
of the onus of proof, this article discusses the onus of proof fi rst because it 
received much more att ention in IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder 
LLC. Beforehand, the facts of the case are briefl y outlined.
B. Facts of IMC AVIATION SOLUTIONS PTY LTD V ALTAIN KHUDER LLC
Altain Khuder LLC (‘Altain’) is a mining company incorporated in Mongolia. 
IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd (‘IMC Solutions’), formerly known as IMC 
Mining Solutions Pty Ltd, is a company incorporated in Australia with 
a registered oﬃ  ce at the same Brisbane address as a company called IMC 
Mining Inc (‘IMC Mining’), which is incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. 
In the relevant period, the same person was the CEO of IMC Solutions and the 
managing director of IMC Mining.
In 2008, a contract naming Altain and IMC Mining as parties was concluded. 
In that contract, Altain appointed IMC Mining as operations manager of a 
Mongolian iron ore mine. A clause in the contract provided for the resolution 
of disputes through good-faith negotiations and, failing that, through 
arbitration in Mongolia. Subsequently, both IMC Mining and IMC Solutions 
performed work on the mine.
In 2009, a dispute arose concerning the provision of services to Altain. 
Altain initiated arbitral proceedings in Mongolia, naming IMC Mining as 
opponent. The arbitral tribunal conducted proceedings and made an award 
ordering both IMC Mining and IMC Solutions (jointly and severally) to pay 
a certain amount of money to Altain. On Altain’s application, a Mongolian 
court verifi ed the arbitral award, naming only IMC Mining as defendant.
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In 2010, Altain initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria for 
the enforcement of the arbitral award against IMC Mining and IMC Solutions. 
Aft er an ex parte hearing, Croft  J made the order sought by Altain. IMC 
Solutions then applied for the order to be set aside in so far as it applied to IMC 
Solutions. Croft  J dismissed the application, and IMC Solutions appealed.
IMC Solutions contended that it had received no notice of the arbitration, 
had not participated in the arbitral proceedings and was not a party to the 
agreement in pursuance of which the award had been made. IMC Solutions 
conceded having worked on the relevant mine but contended that it had been 
involved as IMC Mining’s sub-contractor. Altain contended that the reference 
to IMC Mining in the contract had been meant as a reference to IMC Solutions, 
that IMC Solutions was precluded from contending otherwise, and that the 
persons representing IMC Mining in the arbitral proceedings had represented 
IMC Solutions too. It is the dispute over IMC Solutions’ privity to the relevant 
arbitration agreement that lies in the focus of this article.
C. Onus of Proof in Respect of the Award-Debtor’s Privity to 
the Arbitration Agreement
In Australia and many other countries, court proceedings concerning the 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award have two stages.6 In the fi rst stage, 
the award-creditor needs to satisfy certain threshold requirements to allow 
the court to enforce the award. Where these requirements are not satisfi ed, 
the court will refuse to enforce the award without the need of an objection 
by the award-debtor. Where the award-creditor does satisfy the threshold 
requirements, it is for the award-debtor to challenge the award in the second 
stage of the proceedings. These two stages of the proceedings do not have to 
occur in formally separate phases but they do where, as usual, the fi rst stage 
takes place ex parte.7
An issue extensively discussed in IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain 
Khuder LLC is the parties’ evidentiary obligations in those two stages where 
the arbitration agreement does not name the award-debtor as a party. There 
were three diﬀ erent views between the four judges involved at the two levels.
6 Dardana Ltd v Yukos Oil Co [2002] EWCA Civ 543, [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 819 at 
[10]; Denmark Skibstekniske Konsulenter A/S I Likvidation v Ultrapolis 3000 Investments 
Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 661 at [11], [26] (‘Ultrapolis 3000’); IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd 
v Altain Khuder LLC, supra, n 2 at [132].
7 The International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (‘the 1974 Act’) does not set out the 
enforcement procedure. In Victoria, the procedure is set out in O 9 of the Supreme 
Court (Miscellaneous Proceedings) Rules 2008 (Vic). Order 9.04(1)(b) allows an 
application for the enforcement of an arbitral award to be made ex parte.
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Croft  J at fi rst instance opined that all that the award-creditor needs to do is 
to produce the award and the agreement in pursuance of which the award was 
made, and that it is for the award-debtor to plead and prove that the award-
debtor is not a party to that agreement.8 Warren CJ in the Victorian Court 
of Appeal opined that the award-debtor’s privity to the relevant arbitration 
agreement is a threshold issue to be proved by the award-creditor on a balance 
of probabilities in the fi rst stage of the enforcement proceedings.9 Hansen JA 
and Kyrou AJA in the Court of Appeal steered a middle course by opining that 
the award-creditor needs to produce the award, the agreement and further 
evidence that satisfi es the court on a prima facie basis that the award-debtor is a 
party to the relevant agreement;10 once this is done (in an inter partes hearing), 
it is for the award-debtor to prove on a balance of probabilities that the award-
debtor is not a party to the relevant agreement.11 Aft er assessing the evidence 
de novo, Hansen JA and Kyrou AJA found that Altain had not established, 
even on a prima facie basis, that IMC Solutions was a party to the relevant 
arbitration agreement,12 and they quashed Croft  J’s enforcement order on that 
ground.13 While the reasons for the diﬀ erent assessment of the evidence are of 
no interest here, the allocation of the onus of proof is.
Which of the three views is correct depends upon the interpretation of 
ss 8 and 9 of the 1974 Act, which govern the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards in Australia if the award was made in a country 
that has acceded to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards14 (for example, Mongolia) or if the award-creditor 
is domiciled or ordinarily resident in such a country (including Australia): 
s 8(4) of the 1974 Act.15 Statutory interpretation normally starts with the 
8 Supra, n 1 at [51], [60].
9 Supra, n 2 at [33]–[38].
10 Id at [134]–[139].
11 Id at [169]–[173].
12 Id at [234].
13 Warren CJ left  open how the appeal ought to have been disposed, indicating that 
Her Honour would have preferred remitt ing the case to the Trial Division: supra, 
n 2 at [63].
14 New York, 10 June 1958 (‘the New York Convention’).
15 The recognition and enforcement of other foreign arbitral awards in Australia is 
governed by the common law rules, which do not comply with the New York 
Convention. This is problematic since Australia made no reservation when 
acceding to the Convention, which without any reservation applies to all foreign 
arbitral awards; see Richard Garnett  and Michael Pryles, ‘Enforcement of Foreign 
Awards in Australia and New Zealand’ in International Arbitration in Australia 
(Luke Nott age and Richard Garnett  eds, 2010), Federation Press, p 64; Malcolm 
Holmes and Chester Brown, The International Arbitration Act 1974: A Commentary 
(2011), LexisNexis Butt erworths, para 8.9.
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language of the statute and, at least where the language is ambiguous, 
moves on to considering extrinsic material. However, the sole purpose of the 
original enactment of the 1974 Act was the implementation of the New York 
Convention into Australian law,16 and ss 2D(d) and 39(2)(a) of the 1974 Act 
expressly require Australian courts to have regard to the Act’s object of giving 
eﬀ ect to the Convention when considering whether or not to enforce a foreign 
arbitral award.17 For these reasons, the position under the Convention and the 
legislative history of the 1974 Act will be considered before the language of 
the Act.
The interpretation of ss 8 and 9 of the 1974 Act is not infl uenced by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (‘UNCITRAL’) Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (‘the Model Law’) adopted in 
1985 and revised in 2006,18 which contains provisions on the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards (Arts 35 and 36). While s 16(1) of the 1974 Act 
accords the Model Law in general the force of law in Australia, s 20 of the 
1974 Act excludes the application of the Model Law’s Arts 35 and 36 to the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Australia.19
1. Th e Position under the New York Convention
The New York Convention, which has been acceded to by over 140 countries, 
aims to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements 
and of foreign arbitral awards. Article III of the Convention obliges each 
contracting state to recognise and enforce foreign arbitral awards under the 
16 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 December 
1974, 4390 (Mr Enderby).
17 Sections 2D and 39 were inserted into the 1974 Act by the International Arbitration 
Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) and aim to make Australia more arbitration-friendly: 
Richard Garnett  and Luke Nott age, ‘The 2010 Amendments to the International 
Arbitration Act: A New Dawn for Australia?’ (2011) 7 AIAJ 29 at p 31.
18 In order to harmonise the arbitration laws of diﬀ erent countries, the United 
Nations, in 1985, recommended to its member states the implementation of the 
Model Law. In 2006, UNCITRAL revised the Model Law and the United Nations 
recommended the implementation of the revised Model Law.
19 Section 20 of the 1974 Act excludes the application of Arts 35 and 36 of the 
Model Law even where neither the award nor the award-creditor comes from 
a Convention country and s 8(4) of the Act thus excludes an enforcement of the 
award under the Act; see Garnett  and Pryles, supra, n 15 at p 64; Holmes and 
Brown, supra, n 15 at para 8.9. The opposite view is taken by Martin Davies, 
Andrew Bell and Paul LG Brereton, Nygh’s Confl ict of Laws in Australia (8th Ed, 
2010), LexisNexis Butt erworths, para 43.18.
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conditions laid down in the subsequent articles. Article IV requires the award-
creditor to ‘supply’ to the enforcing court the original or a duly certifi ed copy 
of the award, the original or a duly certifi ed copy of the agreement and, if 
necessary, a certifi ed translation of either document into the oﬃ  cial language 
of the enforcing court. Article V lists grounds that entitle the court to refuse 
to enforce the award. Article V(1) lists grounds to be proved by the award-
debtor, including the invalidity of the arbitration agreement, which can be 
interpreted as encompassing the fact that the award-debtor is not a party 
to the agreement.20 Article V(2) lists grounds that the enforcing court can 
consider ex oﬃ  cio: non-arbitrability of the dispute and public policy. Taken 
literally, Arts IV and V set out an enforcement regime under which all that the 
award-creditor needs to do is to supply the documents listed in Art IV, leaving 
it to the court to invoke Art V(2) and leaving it to the award-debtor to plead 
and prove any ground of non-enforcement listed in Art V(1) including the fact 
that the award-debtor is not a party to the arbitration agreement.
This interpretation of the New York Convention is favoured by 
commentators around the world,21 has been adopted by courts in some 
Convention countries, including the Court of Appeal for England and Wales 
in Dardana Ltd v Yukos Oil Co,22 and was accepted as correct in the parties’ 
submissions before the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Dallah 
Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Pakistan.23 However, courts in other 
Convention countries, including the United States, have required the award-
creditor to prove that the award-debtor is a party to the arbitration agreement, 
on the ground that the parties’ consent to arbitration is the very foundation 
20 David Joseph, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and their Enforcement (2nd Ed, 
2010), Sweet & Maxwell, para 16.72.
21 Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2009), Kluwer Law and Business, 
Vol 2, p 2705; Domenico Di Pietro and Martin Platt e, Enforcement of International 
Arbitration Awards: The New York Convention of 1958 (2001), Cameron May, p 124; 
Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage, Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration (1999), Kluwer Law International, para 1675; Albert J van 
den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation (1981), Kluwer Law and Taxation, pp 247–250.
22 Supra, n 6 at [11]–[13]. See also Aloe Vera of America Inc v Asianic Food (S) Pte Ltd 
[2006] 3 SLR 174 at [61] (‘Aloe Vera v Asianic Food’), where the view was expressed 
with regard to Singapore’s domestic law, and it was implied that Singapore’s law 
complied with the New York Convention; Sarhank Group v Oracle Corp 404 F 3d 657 
at 661–663 (2nd Cir, 2005) (‘Sarhank v Oracle‘), where the award-debtor’s privity 
to the relevant arbitration agreement was discussed under the heading ‘Article V 
Defenses’.
23 [2010] UKSC 46, [2011] 1 AC 763 at [12] (‘Dallah v Pakistan (SC)‘).
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of arbitral proceedings and awards.24 While those decisions focused on the 
interpretation of domestic statutes and said nothing expressly on the position 
under the Convention, it was probably implied that the interpretation of the 
relevant domestic statute complied with the Convention.
A look into the travaux préparatoires of the New York Convention reveals 
that the delegates at the Conference at which the Convention was adopted 
intended to place upon the award-debtor the onus of proving the non-
existence of an arbitration agreement between the award-creditor and the 
award-debtor. The initial draft  of the Convention required the award-creditor 
to prove the existence of such an agreement,25 but the text was redraft ed during 
the Conference ‘so as to require from the claimant only positive evidence that 
his application for enforcement was prima facie justifi ed, leaving it to the party 
opposing enforcement to present such evidence as may be appropriate to 
rebut this claim’.26
It might be argued that this statement has litt le relevance to the situation 
of an arbitration agreement not naming the award-debtor, since that situation 
was not mentioned in the travaux préparatoires and may not have been in 
the delegates’ contemplation. However, while the delegates may not have 
contemplated the specifi c situation of an arbitration agreement not naming 
the award-debtor, they did, of course, know that a valid arbitration agreement 
between the award-creditor and the award-debtor does not exist in all cases 
in which the award-creditor presents a document that purports to contain a 
valid agreement, and they still decided in favour of an enforcement regime 
under which the award-creditor needs to present only a prima facie case for 
enforcement, the award-debtor bearing the onus of rebutt al.
24 Peter Cremer GmbH & Co v Co-operative Molasses Traders Ltd [1985] ILRM 564, 573 
(Supreme Court of Ireland); Javor v Francoeur [2003] BCSC 350, (2003) 13 BCLR 
(4th) 195 at [15], [26]–[27]; Czarina LLC as assignee of Halvanon Insurance Co Ltd 
v WF Poe Syndicate 254 F Supp 2d 1229, 1238 (MD Fla, 2002); China Minmetals 
Materials Import and Export Co Ltd v Chi Mei Corp 334 F 3d 274, 293–294 (3rd Cir, 
2003) (‘China Minmetals‘).
25 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Committ ee on the 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 19th session, Item 14, UN Doc 
E/2704 (28 March 1955) [29].
26 United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on 
International Commercial Arbitration, 17th meeting, UN Doc E/Conf 26/SR 
17 (12 September 1958), p 2 (Mr de Sydow speaking for Working Party No 3); 
emphasis in original.
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Courts in many countries, including the United States, have recognised 
this ‘pro-enforcement bias’ of the New York Convention.27 There is no reason 
why the situation of an arbitration agreement not naming the award-debtor 
ought to be treated diﬀ erently from other situations in which there is no valid 
arbitration agreement between the parties. The travaux préparatoires of the New 
York Convention thus lend strong support to the view that the Convention 
requires the award-debtor to prove that it is not a party to the agreement in 
pursuance of which the award was made. If that view is accepted, the contrary 
view adopted by Warren CJ in IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder 
LLC will not give eﬀ ect to Australia’s obligations under the Convention.
The same may even be true for the view adopted by Hansen JA and Kyrou 
AJA in that case.28 While they required the award-debtor to prove that it is 
not a party to the relevant arbitration agreement, they did require the award-
creditor to do more than just supplying the award and the agreement (and a 
translation if needed) in a case where the award-debtor is not mentioned in 
the agreement. They required the award-creditor to provide further evidence 
to demonstrate that prima facie the award-debtor is a party to the relevant 
arbitration agreement. Arguably, this view confl icts with Art IV of the New 
York Convention pursuant to which the award-creditor needs to do no more 
than supplying the award, the agreement and, if necessary, a translation. In 
support of the view adopted by Hansen JA and Kyrou AJA, it may be argued 
that, according to its travaux préparatoires, the Convention was intended to 
require the award-creditor to provide (only) ‘positive evidence that his 
application for enforcement was prima facie justifi ed’.29 However, nowhere in 
the travaux préparatoires is there any suggestion that the provision of such prima 
facie evidence could ever require more than the supply of the award and the 
agreement. In other words, the supply of the award and the agreement seem 
to have been regarded as always constituting evidence that the application for 
27 For example, Parsons & Whitt emore Overseas Co Inc v Société Générale de l’Industrie du 
Papier (RAKTA) 508 F 2d 969, 973 (2nd Cir, 1974); American Construction Machinery 
& Equipment Co Ltd v Mechanised Construction of Pakistan Ltd 659 F Supp 426, 428 
(SD NY, 1987); Glencore Grain Rott erdam BV v Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co 284 F 
3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir, 2002); China Minmetals, supra, n 24 at p 283; Pacifi c China 
Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Grand Pacifi c Holdings Ltd [2011] HKEC 878, [2011] 4 HKLRD 
188 at [88].
28 The leading expert on the New York Convention, van den Berg, has been quoted 
as saying that the decision by the Victorian Court of Appeal is not in line with 
the Convention; his statement is quoted by Albert Monichino, ‘International 
Arbitration in Australia: The Need to Centralise Judicial Power’ (2012) 86 Australian 
Law Journal 118 at 123.
29 Supra, n 26.
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enforcement is prima facie justifi ed. This view can be justifi ed on the ground 
that the arbitral tribunal, when making the award, must have taken the view 
that the award-debtor is a party to the relevant arbitration agreement, and the 
view of an arbitral tribunal may be regarded as prima facie correct.
Whatever interpretation of the New York Convention is followed, Croft  J’s 
view gives eﬀ ect to Australia’s obligations under the Convention. Even if the 
Convention does not require the domestic laws of the contracting states to be 
as favourable to the award-creditor as Croft  J’s view, the Convention certainly 
allows it. Article VII of the New York Convention permits the contracting 
states to have domestic laws, or enter into treaties, that are more favourable to 
the award-creditor than the Convention itself.30
2. Th e Legislative History of the International 
Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth)
Beyond the objects of a statute expressly mentioned in the statute, the 
legislature’s intention in general infl uences the interpretation of statutory 
provisions.31 Material that may be considered in that context includes the 
second-reading speech by a Minister in a House of Parliament.32 It is clear 
from the Minister’s speech in the House of Representative’s second reading 
of the Arbitration (Foreign Awards and Agreements) Bill 1974, which led to 
the Act now called the International Arbitration Act 1974,33 that Parliament 
intended to introduce an enforcement regime under which the award-creditor 
only needs to produce the award and the agreement (and a translation if 
necessary), leaving it to the award-debtor to plead and prove any ground of 
non-enforcement. On moving that the Bill be read a second time in the House, 
Minister Enderby pointed out that under the then existing law the award-
creditor was obliged ‘to adduce evidence to prove that the parties had duly 
submitt ed the matt er to arbitration’.34 He went on to describe the ‘simpler’ 
enforcement procedure to be enacted:35
Under the Bill a party seeking to enforce a foreign award will need only 
to produce to the Australian court the duly authenticated original award 
30 Di Pietro and Platt e, supra, n 21 at pp 170–171.
31 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 15AA.
32 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 15AB(2)(f).
33 The original name of the Act was Arbitration (Foreign Awards and Agreements) 
Act 1974. The name was changed to International Arbitration Act 1974 by the 
International Arbitration Amendment Act 1989 (Cth), s 4.
34 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 December 
1974, 4391 (Mr Enderby).
35 Ibid.
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or a certifi ed copy of it plus the original or a certifi ed copy of the arbitration 
agreement under which the award purports to have been made … The onus will 
then be on the other party to establish any reason that may exist why the court 
should not enforce the award.
It might again be argued that this statement has litt le relevance to the 
situation of an arbitration agreement not naming the award-debtor since that 
situation was not mentioned by the Minister and may not have been in the 
contemplation of Parliament. It must again be replied that while Parliament 
may not have contemplated the specifi c situation of an arbitration agreement 
not naming the award-debtor, it did make a general policy decision in favour 
of an enforcement regime under which the award-creditor only needs to 
produce certain documents, leaving it to the award-debtor to plead and prove 
any ground of non-enforcement, which must include the fact that the award-
debtor is not a party to the relevant arbitration agreement.
3. Th e Language of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth)
Even though ss 2D(d) and 39(2)(a) of the International Arbitration Act 1974 
(Cth) require Australian courts to have regard to the Act’s object of giving 
eﬀ ect to the New York Convention when considering whether or not to 
enforce a foreign arbitral award, those sections fall short of empowering the 
court to disregard any other section of the Act and thus preserve the general 
rule that the possible meaning of a statutory provision is the outer boundary 
of interpretation.36 It is therefore necessary to determine the extent to which 
the language of the 1974 Act permits giving eﬀ ect to Australia’s obligations 
under the New York Convention. Sections 8 and 9 largely mirror Arts IV and 
V of the Convention, except that the order is reversed. Article 9 of the 1974 
Act requires the award-creditor to ‘produce’ the original or a duly certifi ed 
copy of the award and the agreement and, if necessary, a certifi ed translation 
of either document. Section 8 sets out circumstances that permit a refusal to 
enforce the award. Section 8(5) sets out circumstances (such as the invalidity 
of the arbitration agreement) that the award-debtor needs to plead and prove 
‘to the satisfaction of the court’.37 Section 8(7) sets out circumstances that the 
36 Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 662; Saraswati v R (1990) 172 CLR 1 at 22.
37 The Victorian Court of Appeal in IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder 
LLC held that, as usual in civil proceedings, the standard of proof is a balance 
of probabilities and the cogency of evidence required to satisfy that standard 
depends upon the nature and gravity of the fact to be proved: supra, n 2 at [52]–
[53], [188]–[195]. Croft  J at fi rst instance started from the same position but seems 
to have taken the view that any fact relevant to s 8(5) is so serious as to require 
clear, cogent and strict proof: supra, n 1 at [61]–[64], [88]. With respect, this is 
unconvincing.
Asian International Arbitration Journal (2012) 8 AIAJ142
court can consider ex oﬃ  cio, which are the non-arbitrability of the dispute and 
a violation of public policy by enforcing the award.38
Taken literally, ss 8 and 9 of the 1974 Act provide for the same enforcement 
regime that is provided by the New York Convention: the award-creditor 
only needs to produce the award and the agreement (and a translation if 
necessary), leaving it to the award-debtor to plead and prove any ground 
of non-enforcement.39 It is natural to conclude that the award-debtor bears 
the onus of proving that it is not a party to the agreement in pursuance 
of which the award was made. In IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain 
Khuder LLC, both Croft  J at fi rst instance and Hansen JA and Kyrou AJA in 
the Victorian Court of Appeal did place the onus of proof upon the award-
debtor. Hansen JA and Kyrou AJA pointed in particular to the provision in 
s 8(3A) that ‘[t]he court may only refuse to enforce the foreign award in the 
circumstances mentioned in subsections 5 and 7’.40 However, Warren CJ, who 
classifi ed the award-debtor’s privity to the relevant agreement as a threshold 
issue to be proved by the award-creditor, considered s 8(3A) insignifi cant. 
Despite the absolute language of s 8(3A), Her Honour said, non-enforcement 
is not in fact restricted to the circumstances set out in s 8(5) and (7) since 
the award-creditor’s failure to produce the documents listed in s 9 is another 
ground of non-enforcement. Section 8(3A), Her Honour said, restricts the 
grounds of non-enforcement once the award-creditor has discharged some 
initial burden, but says nothing on what that initial burden is.41 True, the 
award-creditor’s failure to produce the documents listed in s 9 leads to non-
enforcement even though this situation is not mentioned in s 8(3A). But it 
leads to non-enforcement because s 9 expressly imposes certain threshold 
obligations onto the award-creditor. The existence of this express exception to 
s 8(3A) does not entail the possibility of implied exceptions.
38 Section 8(7A), which was inserted into the 1974 Act by the International Arbitration 
Amendment Act 2010 (Cth), clarifi es that the public policy exception applies 
at least where the making of the award was aﬀ ected by fraud, corruption or a 
violation of natural justice.
39 This presupposes, of course, that the award was made against the person against 
whom its enforcement is sought. A minor misspelling of a party’s name in the 
award is no obstacle to enforcement: LKT v Chun, supra, n 4 at [22]–[28].
40 Supra, n 2 at [162]. Section 8(3A) was inserted into the 1974 Act by the International 
Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) in order to overturn decisions recognising 
a residual power of courts to refuse enforcement even where the circumstances set 
out in sub-ss (5) and (7) are not present, eg Re Resort Condominiums International Inc 
[1995] 1 Qd R 406 at 426–427, 432.
41 Supra, n 2 at [40].
Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards in Australia Against 
Non-Signatories of the Arbitration Agreement 143(2012) 8 AIAJ
Warren CJ explained the need for an implied exception to s 8(3A) in the 
following way.42 Since, according to s 8(1), a foreign arbitral award is only 
binding on the parties to the agreement in pursuance of which it was made, 
it must be open to an award-debtor to resist enforcement on the ground that 
it is not a party to that agreement. But s 8(5) does not list lack of privity as a 
ground of non-enforcement. Privity must therefore be a threshold issue to be 
proved by the award-creditor. Warren CJ said nothing on whether the public-
policy exception in s 8(7)(b) can accommodate lack of privity, but this is not 
fatal to her argument since it cannot be assumed that Parliament intended 
such a signifi cant issue as (lack of) privity to be addressed under the broad 
and vague notion of public policy.
Indeed, Hansen JA and Kyrou AJA had a diﬀ erent objection to Warren 
CJ’s argument. They argued that lack of privity falls under s 8(5)(b), which 
concerns the award-debtor’s contention that ‘the arbitration agreement is not 
valid’ under the relevant law. Warren CJ objected that invalidity and lack of 
privity are separate issues: ‘an arbitration agreement pursuant to which the 
award was made may be perfectly valid without the award-debtor being a 
party to it’.43 Hansen JA and Kyrou AJA argued that the expression ‘not valid’ 
means ‘of no legal eﬀ ect’, and that a person who asserts lack of privity is, 
in substance, asserting that the arbitration agreement is of no legal eﬀ ect as 
against that person.44
This is convincing. A distinction between privity and validity would 
be particularly diﬃ  cult where the arbitration agreement was concluded 
by an agent acting in the name of the award-debtor and the award-debtor 
asserts that the agent lacked authority because the instrument purporting 
to grant the agent authority was invalid.45 Furthermore, another ground of 
non-enforcement to be proved by the award-debtor is that the award deals 
with a diﬀ erence not contemplated by, or not falling within the terms of, the 
submission to arbitration, or contains a decision on a matt er beyond the scope of 
the submission to arbitration: s 8(5)(d) of the 1974 Act. In those circumstances, 
too, the award-debtor is not a party to an arbitration agreement that permits 
the award made.
Hansen JA and Kyrou AJA further argued that it would be inconsistent to 
treat lack of privity diﬀ erent from vitiating factors and forgery: ‘There is no 
reason to think that an award-debtor has greater justifi cation to be aggrieved 
42 Id at [41].
43 Ibid.
44 Id at [166].
45 This issue was classifi ed as one of privity in China Minmetals, supra, n 24 at pp 293–
294.
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because it maintains that it was not a party to the arbitration agreement than 
an award-debtor that maintains that the arbitration agreement was invalid 
because it was forged or obtained by fraud’.46 Warren CJ objected that, far 
from being anomalous, the diﬀ erent treatment of privity and vitiating factors 
‘refl ects a sensible policy decision by the legislature to place the onus on the 
award-debtor to impugn the agreement or the award where the documents 
presented to the court pursuant to section 9(1) appear regular on their face, 
but to require the award creditor to explain an apparent irregularity on the 
face of the documents’.47 It is unclear where Warren CJ found this ‘policy 
decision by the legislature’. Neither the language nor the legislative history 
of the 1974 Act indicates any distinction between regularity and irregularity.
4. Conclusion on the Onus of Proof
It is diﬃ  cult to maintain that the language of the 1974 Act requires the placing 
upon the award-creditor of the onus of proof in respect of the award-debtor’s 
privity to the relevant arbitration agreement. It is more convincing to maintain 
that the language of the Act requires the placing upon the award-debtor of 
that onus of proof. Even if that view is rejected, it should at least be conceded 
that the language of the Act permits the placing upon the award-debtor of that 
onus of proof. If, then, the language of the Act is regarded as being open to 
either interpretation, ss 2D and 39 require the court to adopt the interpretation 
that gives eﬀ ect to Australia’s obligations under the New York Convention. 
While the position under the Convention is not sett led, the bett er view is that 
it places the onus of proof upon the award-debtor. Parliament intended the 
award-debtor to bear the onus of proof. It follows that an interpretation of the 
1974 Act that places the onus of proof upon the award-debtor accords with the 
intention of Parliament and is the only interpretation that can safely be said to 
give eﬀ ect to Australia’s obligations under the New York Convention.
That leaves the question of whether the award-creditor is under any 
threshold obligation other than the supply of the award and the agreement 
(and a translation if necessary) where the award-debtor is not named in the 
relevant arbitration agreement. In IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain 
Khuder LLC, Hansen JA and Kyrou AJA in the Victorian Court of Appeal took 
the view that the award-creditor needs to adduce further evidence to establish 
the award-debtor’s privity on a prima facie basis.48 It is unclear where they took 
this requirement from. The 1974 Act does not expressly provide for such a 
requirement, and it is diﬃ  cult to argue that it does so impliedly.
46 Supra, n 2 at [165].
47 Id at [50].
48 Id at [134]–[139].
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All that s 9 of the Act expressly requires the award-creditor to do is to produce 
the award, the agreement and, if necessary, a translation of either document. 
Section 9 may be said to imply that the supply of those documents always 
establishes a prima facie entitlement of the award-creditor to an enforcement of 
the award. Section 9 would thus prohibit the imposition of further threshold 
obligations upon the award-creditor. If that view is rejected, the language 
of the Act must be regarded as ambiguous and the position under the New 
York Convention must be considered. The Convention does not require the 
imposition of further threshold obligations and probably prohibits it. A literal 
interpretation of s 9, under which the supply of the documents mentioned is 
the only threshold obligation of the award-creditor, is the only interpretation 
that can safely be said to give eﬀ ect to Australia’s obligations under the New 
York Convention.
It does not follow that the supply of the award and the agreement always 
obliges the enforcing court to make an enforcement order ex parte. The court 
is entitled, but not obliged, to proceed ex parte. There is much to be said for 
the view, expressed by Hansen JA and Kyrou AJA in IMC Aviation Solutions 
Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC,49 that an award-debtor who is not named in the 
relevant arbitration agreement should always be notifi ed of the enforcement 
application before a decision is made. This is a procedural matt er governed 
not by the 1974 Act but by the law of the Australian state or territory in which 
an enforcement of the award is sought.
D. Which Events Preclude the Award-Debtor from Contesting 
Privity in the Enforcement Proceedings?
In IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC, the onus of proof with 
regard to IMC Solutions’ privity to the arbitration agreement would have been 
irrelevant had IMC Solutions for some reason been precluded from contesting 
privity, obliging the Victorian court to assume privity without investigation. 
Altain indeed contended that such a preclusion existed on four independent 
grounds: the arbitral tribunal’s ruling that IMC Solutions was a party to the 
arbitration agreement, the Mongolian court’s ruling to the same eﬀ ect, IMC 
Solutions’ failure to apply to the Mongolian courts to set aside the award, 
and IMC Solutions’ alleged participation in the arbitral proceedings without 
objecting to the tribunal’s jurisdiction. While the fi rst two grounds concern 
prior decisions by some other tribunal (in a wide sense), the last two grounds 
concern certain (alleged) conduct on the part of IMC Solutions. The four 
grounds shall be discussed individually.
49 Id at [140]–[143].
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There are two preliminary matt ers. The fi rst is the selection of the law 
governing the question of whether an Australian court asked to enforce a foreign 
arbitral award is precluded from investigating a certain issue. Warren CJ in 
IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC correctly observed that no 
choice-of-law question arose in casu since neither party had suggested that the 
law of any jurisdiction other than Victoria governed the issue of preclusion.50 
It is unclear whether Warren CJ saw the possibility of another law applying 
if pleaded and proved by a party. No such possibility should generally exist. 
The question of whether a certain event precludes a litigant from raising a 
certain issue is a question of procedure and thus governed by the lex fori.51 
However, where the event in question took place in a diﬀ erent jurisdiction, the 
law of that jurisdiction may additionally have to be taken into account. Since 
the lex fori of any Australian court includes Australian federal law, another 
preliminary matt er arises, namely the question of whether the International 
Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) expressly or impliedly excludes the application of 
a preclusionary rule derived from any source. Warren CJ convincingly gave a 
negative answer.52
1. Ruling by the Arbitral Tribunal
Is an Australian court that is asked to enforce a foreign arbitral award 
precluded from investigating the award-debtor’s privity to the relevant 
arbitration agreement only because the arbitral tribunal has ruled on that 
issue? Croft  J in IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC made 
confl icting statements. On the one hand, he repeatedly said that the enforcing 
court cannot reopen issues that were before the arbitral tribunal.53 On the 
other hand, he said that an arbitral tribunal’s ruling on its own jurisdiction can 
be reviewed in enforcement proceedings under the New York Convention.54 
Warren CJ in the Victorian Court of Appeal seems to have taken the view 
that the arbitral tribunal’s ruling, while not binding on the enforcing court, 
has evidential value, because Her Honour said that the arbitral tribunal’s 
reasoning process constitutes a factor relevant to the enforcing court’s decision 
and aﬀ ects the weight to be accorded the arbitration agreement.55 Hansen JA 
and Kyrou AJA in the Court of Appeal unequivocally pronounced that the 
50 Id at [25].
51 Carl Zeiss Stift ung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd [1967] 1 AC 853 at 919; American Law 
Institute, Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982) § 1 cmt (d); Born, supra, n 21 
at Vol 1, pp 986–988 (for issues of an arbitral tribunal’s ‘competence-competence’).
52 Supra, n 2 at [26].
53 Supra, n 1 at [59], [64], [69], [95].
54 Id at [68].
55 Supra, n 2 at [51].
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arbitral tribunal’s ruling is neither binding on the enforcing court nor has any 
evidential value.56 This must be correct.
It is a fundamental right of every person in a free society to approach the 
court in order to resolve a dispute with another person.57 A person is obliged 
to arbitrate, and thus loses the right to litigate, only if that person has chosen 
arbitration as the method of dispute resolution. The parties’ agreement to 
arbitrate constitutes the very foundation of the arbitral proceedings and the 
ensuing award. A person who has not consented to being subject to certain 
arbitral proceedings cannot in any way be aﬀ ected by the arbitral tribunal’s 
decision including the ruling that this person has agreed to arbitrate.58 In other 
words, an arbitral tribunal’s ruling that a certain person has agreed to arbitrate 
cannot aﬀ ect that person unless the ruling is correct and the person did in fact 
agree to arbitrate, which can be determined by a court. An arbitral tribunal 
cannot establish its jurisdiction over a person through its own (wrong) ruling 
that this person has agreed to arbitrate. This principle is widely recognised59 
and underlies Art 16(3) of the Model Law, which allows the supervisory court 
to decide on the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction aft er the tribunal itself has 
decided on that issue.60
Of course, the enforcing court is free to examine the arbitral tribunal’s 
reasoning process and may derive assistance from it,61 in the same way in 
which the court may derive assistance from the arguments by counsel before 
56 Id at [264]–[270].
57 Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC 1 at 14; Llewellyn v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd 
[2006] FCA 836, (2006) 154 FCR 293 at [16]. Exceptions are compulsory arbitration 
and compulsory mediation, neither of which is relevant in the present context.
58 Unless the person has, in a separate agreement, conferred upon the arbitral 
tribunal the exclusive right to rule on the question of whether the person is a party 
to the alleged arbitration agreement: First Options of Chicago Inc v Kaplan 514 US 
938 at 943 (1995) (‘First Options v Kaplan‘).
59 Fung Sang Trading Ltd v Kai Sun Sea Products & Food Co Ltd [1992] 1 HKLR 40 at 
50; First Options v Kaplan, supra, n 58 at 943; China Minmetals, supra, n 24 at pp 
289, 293; Sarhank v Oracle, supra, n 22 at 661–663; Dallah v Pakistan (SC), supra, n 23 
at [24]–[30], [84], [99]–[104], [160]. Cf Jiangxi Provincial Metal & Mineral Import & 
Export Corp v Sulanser Co Ltd [1995] 2 HKC 373 at 378–379 (‘Jiangxi Provincial Metal 
v Sulanser’).
60 By contrast, an arbitral tribunal’s ruling that there is no arbitration agreement 
between the parties ought to be preclusive with regard to that issue in subsequent 
litigation between the parties: Born, supra, n 21 at Vol 2, p 2914. If the court 
referred the parties to arbitration on the ground that there is in fact an arbitration 
agreement, the parties would be without recourse to either arbitration or litigation.
61 Dallah v Pakistan (SC), supra, n 23 at [31], [160].
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it. But the arbitral tribunal’s ruling cannot bind the enforcing court and cannot 
even have evidential value.62
The idea that an arbitral tribunal’s ruling on the existence of an agreement to 
arbitrate is binding on the enforcing court may be due to the indiscriminate use 
of the ambiguous term ‘competence-competence’ (from the French compétence-
compétence or the German Kompetenz-Kompetenz) to describe an arbitral 
tribunal’s power to decide on its own jurisdiction. The term ‘competence-
competence’ is used in many areas of law, well beyond arbitration. But it is 
used with two diﬀ erent meanings.63 First, the term ‘competence-competence’ 
is used to describe the principle that a decision-making body has the power 
to decide on whether it has jurisdiction, and thus does not have to refer 
that issue to another body. This principle applies to many decision-making 
bodies64 including arbitral tribunals.65 Arbitral proceedings would be seriously 
inconvenienced if an arbitral tribunal faced with a jurisdictional challenge 
were forced to either suspend proceedings and await a judicial determination 
of the issue or to immediately proceed to considering the merits of the 
dispute and making an award subject to judicial confi rmation of the arbitral 
tribunal’s jurisdiction.66 In that sense, arbitral tribunals have ‘competence-
competence’.67 But the term ‘competence-competence’ is also used to describe 
62 Id at [30]; Ultrapolis 3000, supra, n 6 at [38]–[39].
63 In the context of arbitration, three diﬀ erent meanings are identifi ed by William 
W Park, ‘Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of Tasks Between Courts 
and Arbitrators’ (1997) 8 American Review of International Arbitration 133 at 140: 
‘(1) arbitrators need not stop the arbitration when one party objects to their 
jurisdiction; (2) courts will delay consideration of arbitral jurisdiction until an 
award is made; (3) arbitrators may decide on their own jurisdiction free from 
judicial review’.
64 Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1 December 1926 (Advisory Opinion) (1928) 10 BYBIL 
231 (PCĲ ) at 243 (‘as a general rule, any body possessing jurisdictional powers has 
the right in the fi rst place itself to determine the extent of its jurisdiction’); Allianz 
SpA (formerly Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà SpA) v West Tankers Inc (C185/07) [2009] 
ECR I-663, Opinion of AG Kokott , at [57] (‘the general principle that every court is 
entitled to examine its own jurisdiction’).
65 Peter Binder, International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL 
Model Law Jurisdictions (3rd Ed, 2010), Sweet & Maxwell, paras 4.006–4.008; Born, 
supra, n 21 at Vol 1, pp 966–967; Art 16(1) sentence 1 of the Model Law 2006: ‘The 
arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with 
respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement’.
66 Christopher Brown Ltd v Genossenschaft  Oesterreichischer Waldbesitzer Holzwirtschaf-
tsbetriebe RGmbH [1954] 1 QB 8 at 12.
67 The Model Law and some national legal systems allow recourse to the court while 
the arbitral proceedings are continuing: Pieter Sanders, Quo Vadis Arbitration? Sixty 
continued on the next page
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the diﬀ erent principle that a decision-making body has the exclusive power 
to decide on its own jurisdiction, so that its ruling on that issue binds other 
decision-making bodies.68 That principle does not apply to arbitral tribunals, 
as explained before. It is therefore important to clarify in which sense the term 
‘competence-competence’ is being used if it is used at all.
2. Ruling by the Supervisory Court
Is an Australian court that is asked to enforce a foreign arbitral award 
precluded from investigating the award-debtor’s privity to the relevant 
arbitration agreement only because the supervisory court has ruled on that 
issue? While Croft  J in IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC 
opined that a ruling by the supervisory court may raise an issue estoppel 
in enforcement proceedings (without specifying when exactly this would be 
the case),69 neither Warren CJ nor Hansen JA and Kyrou AJA in the Victorian 
Court of Appeal made a distinction between a ruling by the arbitral tribunal 
and a ruling by the supervisory court.70 All judges in the Victorian Court of 
Appeal thus seem to have taken the view that a ruling by the supervisory 
court is never binding on the enforcing court. No explanation was given for 
this proposition.
The idea that an arbitral tribunal’s ruling on the award-debtor’s consent to 
arbitration is binding on the enforcing court has been rejected on the ground 
that a person is not bound by an arbitral tribunal’s decision, including the 
ruling that this person has agreed to arbitrate, unless the person has in fact 
agreed to arbitrate. The same reason does not apply to the ruling of the 
supervisory court. A person may be bound by the judgment of a court even 
without having agreed to the court having jurisdiction.71 An Australian court’s 
fi nal and conclusive decision on the merits of a case binds other Australian 
courts in that it creates an estoppel per rem judicatam between the parties to 
the original litigation, preventing them from re-litigating the same cause 
Years of Arbitration Practice (1999), Kluwer Law International, pp 178–184; William 
W Park, ‘The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction’ in International 
Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics? (Albert J van den Berg ed, 2007), Kluwer Law 
International, pp 80–88.
68 This is the traditional understanding of the term Kompetenz-Kompetenz in 
German law: Born, supra, n 21 at Vol 1, p 854; Gaillard and Savage, supra, n 21 at 
para 651.
69 Supra, n 1 at [70]–[75].
70 Supra, n 2 at [51] (Warren CJ), [264]–[270] (Hansen JA and Kyrou AJA).
71 Jonathan v Kyogle Council [2012] NSWLEC 16 at [8].
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of action (cause-of-action estoppel) or the same issue (issue estoppel).72 A 
foreign judgment creates a cause-of-action estoppel73 or an issue estoppel74 
in Australian litigation if the requirements for the recognition of the foreign 
judgment in Australia are satisfi ed.75 Where those requirements are satisfi ed, 
the Australian court is bound by the foreign court’s decision even if the 
judgment-debtor took no part in the foreign proceedings.76 It is diﬃ  cult to 
see why these general principles should not apply to the supervisory court’s 
ruling that the award-debtor is a party to the agreement in pursuance of which 
an arbitral award has been made.
An Australian court is bound by a foreign judgment that is entitled to 
recognition in Australia and, as part of its ratio,77 contains the ruling that 
a certain person is a party to a certain agreement that is not an arbitration 
72 Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446 at 466 (per Fullagar J): ‘The rule as to res 
judicata can be stated suﬃ  ciently for present purposes by saying that, where an 
action has been brought and judgment has been entered in that action, no other 
proceedings can thereaft er be maintained on the same cause of action … The 
rule as to issue estoppel is generally stated in the words of Lord Ellenborough 
in Outram v. Morewood. His Lordship said that parties and privies are “precluded 
from contending to the contrary of that point, or matt er of fact, which having been 
once distinctly put in issue by them … has been, on such issue joined, solemnly 
found against them”’ (citation omitt ed). See also Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 
at 531–533 (per Dixon J).
73 Miller v Caddy (1985) 80 FLR 398 at 404–405; Spirits International BV v Federal 
Treasury Enterprise (FKP) Sojuzplodoimport [2011] FCAFC 69, (2011) 91 IPR 438 at 
[45] (‘Spirits v Sojuzplodoimport ‘); Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), s 12 (‘the 
1991 Act’).
74 The Society of Lloyd’s v White [2004] VSCA 101 at [21]; Armacel Pty Ltd v Smurfi t 
Stone Container Corp [2008] FCA 592, (2008) 248 ALR 573 at [66], [83]; Spirits v 
Sojuzplodoimport, supra, n 73 at [45]; Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), s 12.
75 Depending upon the country and court from which the judgment originates, the 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in Australia is governed by 
the common law rules, the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) or Pt 7 of the Trans-
Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth). At common law, a foreign judgment is entitled 
to recognition in the forum, subject to defences, if it is a fi nal and conclusive 
judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction (in the eyes 
of the lex fori) between the same parties: The Sennar (No 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490 at 
499. The Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) contains similar requirements, but 
the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) facilitates the recognition of New 
Zealand judgments in Australia.
76 An example is Independent Trustee Services Ltd v Morris [2010] NSWSC 1218.
77 Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155 at 170; Blair v Curran, supra, 
n 72 at 531–533; Kemp v Pearce [1972] VR 805 at 811–814; Yukos Capital Sarl v OJSC 
Rosneft  Oil Co [2011] EWHC 1461 (Comm), [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 479 at [50].
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agreement. There is no reason why things ought to be diﬀ erent only because 
the agreement is an agreement to arbitrate. A ruling by a foreign court other 
than the supervisory court that a certain person is a party to a certain arbitration 
agreement ought to bind Australian courts if the foreign judgment is generally 
entitled to recognition in Australia. This applies whether the foreign judgment 
was made on the application for the enforcement of an arbitral award78 or 
prior to the arbitral proceedings, for example on an application to stay court 
proceedings in favour of arbitration.79
There is no reason why things ought to be diﬀ erent only because the foreign 
court is the supervisory court for the arbitration at issue. If anything, a decision 
on the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdictions ought to have greater, not less, weight 
if it comes from the supervisory court than from any other foreign court. It 
follows that a ruling by the supervisory court that a certain person is a party 
to the relevant arbitration agreement ought to bind Australian courts if the 
supervisory court’s judgment is generally entitled to recognition in Australia.80 
This applies whether the judgment was made prior to arbitral proceedings, 
for example where a declaration was sought,81 or in an application to annul or 
verify an arbitral award.
78 See Karaha Bodas Co LLC v Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara 
(2003) 28 YB Comm Arb 752 at 785–786 (High Court of Hong Kong); Born, supra, 
n 21 at Vol 2, p 2674; Joseph, supra, n 20 at para 16.63; generally also Talia Einhorn, 
‘The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments on International 
Commercial Arbitral Awards’ (2010) 12 Yearbook of Private International Law 43 at 
64. By contrast, where a foreign court has denied enforcement of an arbitral award 
on the ground that the award-debtor is not a party to the relevant arbitration 
agreement, the Australian court might be obliged to make its own ruling on 
the issue since Art III of the New York Convention might oblige the court of a 
contracting state to enforce a foreign arbitral award unless that court fi nds a 
ground of non-recognition under Art V.
79 By contrast, where a foreign court has refused a stay of proceedings on the ground 
that the defendant is not a party to the arbitration agreement in question, the 
Australian court may be obliged to make its own ruling on the issue because 
Art II(3) of the New York Convention may oblige the court of a contracting state 
to stay proceedings whenever there is a relevant arbitration agreement in that 
court’s view.
80 This view has been taken in other common law jurisdictions as enforcing forum: 
Minmetals Germany GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 315 at 330, 
[1999] CLC 647 at 661 (‘Minmetals v Ferco‘); Aloe Vera v Asianic Food, supra, n 22 
at [56]; Dallah v Pakistan [2009] EWCA Civ 755, [2011] 1 AC 763 at [56]; Dallah v 
Pakistan (SC), supra, n 23 at [98] (per Lord Collins JSC); see also Jiangxi Provincial 
Metal v Sulanser, supra, n 59 at 378; Newspeed International Ltd v Citus Trading Pte Ltd 
[2003] 3 SLR 1 at [19]–[30] (‘Newspeed v Citus‘).
81 See Toepfer International GmbH v Molino Boschi Srl [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 510 at 513.
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Unless the arbitration was seated in New Zealand,82 the recognition of 
the supervisory court’s judgment in Australia requires that the supervisory 
court was a competent court in the eyes of Australian law.83 Where the award-
debtor was the defendant in the proceedings before the supervisory court and 
neither appeared before that court without contesting the court’s jurisdiction 
nor was present in the seat of the arbitration when those proceedings began, 
the supervisory court was a competent court only if the award-debtor had 
entered into a jurisdiction agreement in favour of the supervisory court,84 
which is implied in the arbitration agreement.85 In that situation, therefore, 
the supervisory court’s judgment cannot be recognised in Australia unless 
the award-debtor is a party to the relevant arbitration agreement. Where the 
award-debtor’s privity to the agreement is a prerequisite of issue estoppel, 
such privity cannot be assumed as a result of an issue estoppel but needs to 
be determined by the Australian court.
In IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC, the judgment by 
the Mongolian court could not create an issue estoppel between Altain and 
IMC Solutions in the Victorian proceedings because IMC Solutions was not a 
party to the proceedings before the Mongolian court. An issue estoppel, like 
a cause-of-action estoppel, can only arise between those parties to the present 
proceedings that were parties to the previous proceedings.86
3. Failure to Challenge the Award in the Supervisory Court
In IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC, Altain argued that 
IMC Solutions’ failure to seek an annulment of the award by the Mongolian 
supervisory court precluded IMC Solutions from contesting its privity to the 
relevant arbitration agreement in the Victorian enforcement proceedings. 
Hansen JA and Kyrou AJA in the Victorian Court of Appeal gave this argument 
short shrift .87 They approvingly quoted the following statement made by Lord 
82 The recognition and enforcement of New Zealand judgments in Australia pursuant 
to Pt 7 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) does not generally require 
the New Zealand court to be a competent court in the eyes of Australian law.
83 Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), s 7(2)(a)(iv),(3)–(5); De Santis v Russo [2001] 
QCA 457, [2002] 2 Qd R 230 at [9]–[10].
84 Ibid.
85 C v D [2007] EWCA Civ 1282, [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 1001 at [17]; Xiamen Xinjingdi 
Group Ltd v Eton Properties Ltd [2008] 6 HKC 287 at [61] (‘Xiamen Xinjingdi v Eton‘); 
Altain Khuder LLC v IMC Mining Inc, supra, n 1 at [67].
86 Blohn v Desser [1962] 2 QB 116 at 124–125; Newcom Holdings Pty Ltd v Funge Systems 
Inc [2006] SASC 284 at [33], [40]; Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), ss 7(2)(a)(viii), 
12(1).
87 Supra, n 2 at [318]–[321].
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Mance JSC in the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Dallah v Pakistan 
(SC):88
A person who denies being party to any relevant arbitration agreement 
has no obligation to participate in the arbitration or to take any steps in the 
country of the seat of what he maintains to be an invalid arbitration leading 
to an invalid award against him. The party initiating the arbitration must try 
to enforce the award where it can. Only then and there is it incumbent on the 
defendant denying the existence of any valid award to resist enforcement.
This view is convincing. Indeed, it is the only tenable view if it is thought that 
a ruling by the supervisory court that the award-debtor is not a party to the 
relevant arbitration agreement can never bind a foreign enforcing court. It 
would be untenable to hold that the award-debtor must challenge the arbitral 
tribunal’s jurisdiction before the supervisory court, lest this challenge be 
precluded in foreign enforcement proceedings, and must raise the challenge 
again before the foreign enforcing court even if the supervisory court has ruled 
in the award-debtor’s favour. This would always require double litigation 
over the same issue, which is ineﬃ  cient.89
But even if it is thought that a ruling by the supervisory court that the 
award-debtor is not a party to the relevant arbitration agreement does bind 
a foreign enforcing court at least where the supervisory court’s judgment 
fulfi ls the requirements for the recognition of foreign judgments in the 
enforcement forum,90 it is unconvincing to preclude a challenge to the arbitral 
88 Supra, n 23 at [23]. See also Paklito Investment Ltd v Klockner East Asia Ltd [1993] 
2 HKLR 39 at 48–49; Svenska Petroleum Exploration AB v Lithuania (No 2) [2006] 
EWCA Civ 1529, [2007] QB 886 at [104]; Galsworthy Ltd v Glory Wealth Shipping Pte 
Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 727 at [8].
89 For similar reasons, there should be no preclusionary eﬀ ect only because the 
award-debtor took no part in the arbitral proceedings and thus failed to challenge 
the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction before the tribunal itself. A diﬀ erent view was 
taken in Kanto Yakin Kogyo Kabushiki-Kaisha v Can-Eng Manufacturing Ltd (1992) 7 
OR (3d) 779 at 791.
90 The New York Convention does not preclude such an issue estoppel since its 
Art V(1)(e) permits the non-enforcement of an award that has been annulled by 
the supervisory court, for example on the ground that the award-debtor is not a 
party to the arbitration agreement: Born, supra, n 21 at Vol 2, pp 2696–2697. If an 
issue estoppel requires that the annulment decision is entitled to recognition in 
Australia under the general rules, the supervisory court should always be regarded 
as a competent court; see Georgios Petrochilos, Procedural Law in International 
Arbitration (2004), Oxford University Press, para 7.59. Some commentators go 
further and argue that an annulment decision must always be recognised by 
other courts: Hamid G Gharavi, ‘Chromalloy: Another View’ (1997) 12:1 Mealey’s 
International Arbitration Report 21; Albert J van den Berg, ‘Enforcement of Annulled 
Awards?’ (1998) 9 ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 15.
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tribunal’s jurisdiction before the enforcing court only because the award-
debtor has failed to seek an annulment of the award by the supervisory 
court.91 The opposite view heavily restricts the applicability of Art V(1)(a)–(d) 
of the New York Convention, which permit the non-enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in cases of procedural irregularity in the arbitral proceedings, 
including the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the arbitral tribunal. Art V(1)
(e) permits the non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award that has been set 
aside by the supervisory court.
If the failure to challenge a foreign arbitral award in the supervisory 
court precluded the award-debtor from challenging the arbitral tribunal’s 
jurisdiction in foreign enforcement proceedings, Art V(1)(a)–(d) of the New 
York Convention would be relevant only where a decision by the supervisory 
court is not, or would not be, entitled to recognition in the enforcement 
forum. Otherwise, a ruling by the supervisory court that there was no 
procedural irregularity in the arbitral proceedings would create an issue 
estoppel preventing the enforcing court from invoking Art V(1)(a)–(d), and an 
annulment of the award by the supervisory court on the ground of procedural 
irregularity in the arbitral proceedings would permit the enforcing court to 
refuse enforcement pursuant to Art V(1)(e). Article V(1)(a)–(d) would not 
apply in either case.
Article V(1)(a)–(d) of the New York Convention cannot have been intended 
to apply only where a decision by the supervisory court is not, or would not 
be, entitled to recognition in the enforcement forum. An award-debtor ought 
to be entitled to wait and see whether the award-creditor seeks an enforcement 
of the award outside the seat of the arbitration, and challenge the award if 
and when such enforcement is sought. As Lord Collins JSC said in Dallah v 
Pakistan (SC):92
[I]n an international commercial arbitration a party which objects to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal has two options. It can challenge the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction in the courts of the arbitral seat; and it can resist enforcement in the 
court before which the award is brought for recognition and enforcement. These 
91 There is some support for such a preclusion: Minmetals v Ferco, supra, n 80 at 330 and 
661, respectively; Petrochilos, supra, n 90 at paras 4.21, 7.61; Christer Söderlund, 
‘Lis Pendens, Res Judicata and the Issue of Parallel Judicial Proceedings’ (2005) 
22 Journal of International Arbitration 301 at 310. See also Xiamen Xinjingdi v Eton, 
supra, n 85 at [61]–[72].
92 Supra, n 23 at [98]. See also Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd 
[1999] 1 HKLRD 665 at 688–689 (Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal) (‘Hebei Import 
& Export Corp‘); Newspeed v Citus, supra, n 80 at [20]–[28]; Aloe Vera v Asianic Food, 
supra, n 22 at [53]–[56].
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two options are not mutually exclusive, although in some cases a determination 
by the court of the seat may give rise to an issue estoppel or other preclusive 
eﬀ ect in the court in which enforcement is sought. The fact that jurisdiction can 
no longer be challenged in the courts of the seat does not preclude consideration 
of the tribunal’s jurisdiction by the enforcing court …
4. Participation in the Arbitration without Contesting the 
Tribunal’s Jurisdiction
In IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC, Altain argued that IMC 
Solutions was precluded from contesting its privity to the relevant arbitration 
agreement in the Victorian enforcement proceedings because IMC Solutions 
had participated in the arbitral proceedings without objecting to the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction. IMC Solutions disputed having participated in the arbitration. 
Croft  J found that IMC Solutions had in fact participated in the arbitral 
proceedings and failed to then argue that it was not a party to the relevant 
arbitration agreement,93 and he held, without further explanation, that IMC 
Solutions’ failure to raise this issue in the arbitral proceedings estopped IMC 
Solution from raising the issue in the proceedings before him.94 In the Victorian 
Court of Appeal, Hansen JA and Kyrou AJA found that IMC Solutions had 
not participated in the arbitral proceedings,95 and neither they nor Warren 
CJ expressed a view on whether a preclusionary eﬀ ect would otherwise have 
existed. It is submitt ed that Croft  J was correct to recognise a preclusionary 
eﬀ ect on the basis of the facts he found.
Courts in several countries have precluded an award-debtor from raising 
in enforcement proceedings a complaint of procedural irregularity in arbitral 
proceedings where the award-debtor participated in the arbitral proceedings 
without raising the complaint even though it was possible to raise it.96 This 
rule has been applied to an objection to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction on 
the ground that the party in question is not a party to the relevant arbitration 
93 Supra, n 1 at [85].
94 Id at [98].
95 Supra, n 2 at [201]–[239].
96 Ghirardosi v Minister of Highways (BC) (1966) 56 DLR (2d) 469 at 473–474; Chrome 
Resources SA v Lazarus Ltd (1978) 11 YB Comm Arb 538 at [8] (Supreme Court 
of Switzerland); AAOT Foreign Economic Association (VO) Technostroyexport v 
International Development and Trade Services Inc 139 F 3d 980 at 982 (2nd Cir, 1998) 
(‘AAOT Technostroyexport v IDTS ‘), citing several other US decisions; Minmetals 
v Ferco, supra, n 80 at 330 and 661–662, respectively; Hebei Import & Export Corp, 
supra, n 92 at pp 689–690; Sam Ming City Forestry Economic Co v Lam Pun Hung 
[2001] 3 HKC 573 at 579 (Hong Kong Court of Appeal).
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agreement.97 Three independent arguments can be made for an application of 
this preclusionary rule in Australian proceedings concerning the enforcement 
of a foreign arbitral award.98
First, it can be argued that the New York Convention enshrines the principle 
of good faith and precludes an award-debtor from raising in enforcement 
proceedings a ground of refusal set out in Art V(1) of the Convention where 
the award-debtor, in bad faith, failed to raise that ground in the arbitral 
proceedings. Van den Berg has made this argument with regard to the 
formal invalidity of the arbitration agreement pursuant to Art II(2) of the 
Convention,99 and Kaplan J in the High Court of Hong Kong has supported 
this argument for any ground of non-enforcement set out in Art V(1) of the 
Convention.100
Second, the preclusionary rule may be derived from Art 16(2) of the 
Model Law, which has the force of law in Australia pursuant to s 16(1) of 
the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth). Article 16(2), which deals with 
certain pleas in arbitral proceedings, provides in its fi rst sentence: ‘A plea that 
the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than 
the submission of the statement of defence’. The fourth sentence of Art 16(2) 
reads: ‘The arbitral tribunal may … admit a later plea if it considers the delay 
justifi ed’. The combined eﬀ ect of those two sentences is that the failure to raise 
a jurisdictional challenge at or before the submission of defence precludes 
the party from raising the defence at a later stage of the arbitral proceedings 
unless the tribunal grants an exception.101 According to the travaux préparatoires 
97 La Societe Nationale des Hydrocarbures v Shaheen Natural Resources Co Inc 585 F Supp 
57 at 62 (SD NY, 1983); aﬃ  rmed 733 F 2d 260 (2nd Cir, 1984).
98 No preclusionary eﬀ ect should arise where, in the arbitral proceedings, the 
award-debtor both challenged the tribunal’s jurisdiction and argued the merits of 
the dispute: see China Minmetals, supra, n 24 at p 290.
99 Van den Berg, supra, n 21 at p 185.
100 China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp Shenzen Branch v Gee Tai Holdings Co Ltd [1995] 
2 HKLR 215 at 223–225. This view was described as one possible basis of the 
preclusionary eﬀ ect in casu in Hebei Import & Export Corp, supra, n 92 at pp 689–
690.
101 Article 4 of the Model Law provides for the preclusion of complaints about 
the non-compliance with non-mandatory provisions of the Model Law or with 
procedural requirements set out in the arbitration agreement where the complaint 
was not made without undue delay or within a time period set. Article 4 does not 
apply to jurisdictional challenges because Art 16(2) is lex specialis. The view that 
Art 4 does not apply to jurisdictional challenges because Art 16 is a mandatory 
provision is taken by Binder, supra, n 65 at para 4.015.
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of Art 16,102 which an Australian court may consider in interpreting the Model 
Law,103 the preclusionary eﬀ ect prescribed in Art 16(2) was intended to obtain 
not only in the arbitral proceedings but also in subsequent annulment or 
enforcement proceedings, subject to public policy including arbitrability.104
If it is accepted that Art 16(2) contains a preclusionary rule applying in 
enforcement proceedings, the question arises whether the applicability of that 
rule requires that Art 16(2) of the Model Law, or a provision to like eﬀ ect, is 
contained not only in the law governing the enforcement procedure but also in 
the law governing the arbitral proceedings.105 The preclusion of a challenge in 
enforcement proceedings may be considered unjust where the award-debtor 
chose not to raise the challenge in the arbitral proceedings in reliance on the 
law governing those proceedings. No preclusion ought to obtain at least in the 
situation where the award-debtor did raise the jurisdictional challenge in the 
arbitral proceedings but did so at a later time than allowed by Art 16(2) of the 
Model Law because the law governing the arbitral proceedings permitt ed the 
raising of the challenge at that later time.106 Where the award-debtor failed to 
raise the defence at all in the arbitral proceedings, the question of whether a 
preclusionary eﬀ ect in enforcement proceedings requires the law governing 
the arbitral proceedings to contain a preclusionary rule has litt le practical 
signifi cance since most national laws and institutional arbitration rules do 
contain Art 16(2) of the Model Law or a similar provision.107
102 UNCITRAL, Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices 
on the work of its seventh session, 17th sess, UN Doc A/CN.9/246 (6–17 February 
1984) [51]; UNCITRAL, Analytical Commentary on Draft  Text of a Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration, 18th sess, A/CN.9/264 (25 March 1985), 
Art 16 at [8]–[10].
103 International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), s 17(1).
104 The preclusionary eﬀ ect by virtue of Art 4 was also intended to extend to 
subsequent annulment or enforcement proceedings: UNCITRAL Report on the 
work of its eighteenth session, UN Doc A/40/17 (3–21 June 1985) [57] (where it 
is further said that an arbitral tribunal’s decision on whether a party has waived 
an objection pursuant to Art 4 is not binding on either the supervisory court or 
a foreign enforcing court); Nigel Blackaby and Constantine Partasides, Redfern 
and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th Ed, 2009), Oxford University Press, 
para 5.125 n 177.
105 A similar question arises where a judgment rendered in one country is said to 
have a preclusionary eﬀ ect in litigation in another country; see Peter Barnett , 
‘The Prevention of Abusive Cross-Border Re-Litigation’ (2002) 51 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 943 at 953–957.
106 See Di Pietro and Platt e, supra, n 21 at p 158.
107 Born, supra, n 21 at Vol 1, pp 989–990.
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Third, an analogy can be made to the preclusionary rule that applies in 
Australian proceedings for the enforcement of a foreign judgment under 
the common law rules. A judgment-debtor who participated in the foreign 
litigation cannot raise in Australian enforcement proceedings a defence 
(other than fraud108) that could have been, but was not, raised in the foreign 
litigation.109 Indeed, the failure to object to the jurisdiction of the foreign 
court in the foreign litigation constitutes a submission to that jurisdiction, 
rendering the foreign court a competent court in the eyes of Australian law.110 
This preclusionary rule is justifi ed by ‘considerations of comity and the 
duty of the courts to put an end to litigation’.111 It forces litigants to raise all 
available defences before the court and prevents them from keeping a defence 
as a ‘trump in the sleeve’ to be played if they lose the case and the opponent 
seeks enforcement of the judgment in another country. The preclusionary rule 
may also be regarded as an instance of estoppel by representation because 
it protects a litigant’s reasonable belief in the absence or waiver of a certain 
defence where that belief was induced by the opponent’s appearance before 
the court without raising that defence.
These two rationales apply with equal, if not stronger, force where the 
original proceedings were arbitral rather than judicial proceedings. It would 
thwart the goal of making arbitration an eﬃ  cient and timely method of 
resolving commercial disputes112 were a party to arbitral proceedings allowed 
to withhold a defence in those proceedings and raise it if that party loses 
the case and the opponent seeks judicial enforcement of the award. The law 
ought to protect the reasonable belief by a party to arbitral proceedings that 
the opponent is unable or unwilling to raise a certain defence where that 
belief was induced by the opponent’s appearance before the tribunal without 
raising that defence.
There are two fi nal observations. First, if the failure to raise a certain 
objection in arbitral proceedings (not seated in Australia) precludes the 
108 Norman v Norman (No 2) (1968) 12 FLR 39 at 47; Yoon v Song [2000] NSWSC 1147, 
(2000) 158 FLR 295 at [22]; De Santis v Russo [2001] QSC 65, (2001) 27 Fam LR 414 
at [16]; Trainor Asia Ltd v Calverley [2007] WADC 124, (2007) 53 SR (WA) 277 at [25]–
[28]; Mobi-Light Inc v KK Machinery Pty Ltd [2010] WADC 105 at [45]–[48]. Cf Keele 
v Findley (1990) 21 NSWLR 444.
109 Ellis v M’Henry (1871) LR 6 CP 228 at 238; Israel Discount Bank of New York v 
Hadjipateras [1984] 1 WLR 137 at 144, 146 (‘Israel Discount Bank of NY v Hadjipateras‘). 
See also Stern v National Australia Bank [1999] FCA 1421 at [137], [145], [147].
110 Gutnick v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2001] VSC 305 at [112]; De Santis v Russo, supra, 
n 83 at [11]; Fletcher Steel v Moghe [2006] NSWSC 425 at [10]. See also Foreign 
Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), ss 7(5), 11.
111 Israel Discount Bank of NY v Hadjipateras, supra, n 109 at p 144 (per Stephenson LJ).
112 See International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), s 39(2)(b)(i).
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raising of this objection when enforcement of the award in Australia is 
sought, so must a fortiori the failure to raise an objection during annulment 
or verifi cation proceedings before the supervisory court.113 Second, whatever 
the jurisdictional basis of the preclusionary rule, the award-debtor ought to 
be able to escape preclusion by proving that the raising of the objection in the 
previous (arbitral or judicial) proceedings would have been futile (because, 
for example, the tribunal or court was corrupt),114 or that, at the relevant time, 
the award-debtor was not, and could not with due diligence have been, aware 
of the facts giving rise to the objection.115 However, an award-debtor who, 
before the enforcing court, denies being a party to the relevant arbitration 
agreement will rarely be able to prove that, at the time of the previous (arbitral 
or judicial) proceedings, the award-debtor reasonably believed to be a party 
to that agreement.
E. Conclusion
This article has investigated two questions that may arise in Australian 
proceedings for the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award where the award-
debtor is not named in the relevant arbitration agreement and asserts that it 
is not a party to that agreement. The fi rst question that may be contested in 
those circumstances is whether the award-debtor is for some reason precluded 
from denying its privity to the relevant arbitration agreement. This article 
has argued that no such preclusion ought to exist only because the arbitral 
tribunal has ruled that the award-debtor is a party to the relevant arbitration 
agreement, or only because the award-debtor has failed to seek an annulment 
of the award by the supervisory court. By contrast, the award-debtor 
ought to be precluded from denying its privity to the relevant arbitration 
agreement where the award-debtor participated in the arbitral proceedings 
without raising the issue even though it could have been raised, or where the 
supervisory court has ruled that the award-debtor is a party to the relevant 
arbitration agreement and that ruling creates an issue estoppel in Australian 
proceedings under the rules governing the recognition of foreign judgments 
in Australia.
113 Hebei Import & Export Corp, supra, n 92 at pp 689–690, with regard to enforcement 
proceedings in Hong Kong.
114 Petrochilos, supra, n 90 at para 4.26. In those circumstances, the objection may still 
be precluded if it was not brought to the opponent’s att ention during the previous 
proceedings: AAOT Technostroyexport v IDTS, supra, n 96 at p 982.
115 Petrochilos, supra, n 90 at para 4.25. Section 73(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996 
[UK] contains this exception to the preclusionary eﬀ ect that otherwise obtains 
in proceedings before English courts by virtue of the failure to raise in English 
arbitral proceedings an objection of procedural irregularity.
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116 Dampskibsselskabet Norden A/S v Beach Building and Civil Group Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 
696 at [89]–[91]. This decision came too late to be fully discussed in this article.
Where the award-debtor is not precluded from denying its privity to the 
relevant arbitration agreement and the Australian court thus needs to rule on 
this issue, the onus of proof with regard to the issue may become relevant. 
This article has argued that all that the award-creditor needs to do is to 
produce the award and the agreement in pursuance of which the award was 
made (and a translation of either document if necessary), and that it is for the 
award-debtor to plead and prove that it is not a party to that agreement. This 
view, taken by Croft  J as trial judge in IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain 
Khuder LLC, is the only view that can safely be said to give eﬀ ect to Australia’s 
obligations under the New York Convention.
For that reason, this article has rejected the view taken by Hansen JA and 
Kyrou AJA in the Victorian Court of Appeal in IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd 
v Altain Khuder LLC that the award-creditor needs to provide the award, the 
agreement and further evidence to demonstrate on a prima facie basis that 
the award-debtor is a party to the relevant arbitration agreement. Even more 
problematic is the view taken by Warren CJ in the Court of Appeal that the 
award-debtor’s privity to the relevant arbitration agreement is a threshold 
issue to be proved by the award-creditor on a balance of probabilities. It is 
to be welcomed that Foster J in the Federal Court of Australia has recently 
adopted the view taken by Croft  J in IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain 
Khuder LLC and refused to adopt either view expressed in the Victorian Court 
of Appeal in that case.116
